张维为：中国的底线必须得到尊重
自1972年中日邦交正常化以来，两国关系从未像今天这般险恶。许多观察家们甚至将中日间的紧张局势与百年前第一次世界大战爆发前夕的欧洲相提并论。虽然这样的类比过于危言耸听——毕竟北京、东京与华盛顿三方出于对共同经济利益以及对世界繁荣的考虑，都不希望本地区爆发战事，但毋庸置疑，中日关系确实正在滑向危险的边缘。
尽管西方媒体纷纷对“强硬的中国”大加渲染，多数中国人却认为日本应为弄僵中日关系负责，中方的观点值得国际社会的重视。从中国的角度观察，日本国内政治的“向右转”是造成当前中日失和的主要原因；而这场“向右转”又是日本社会中内部的三重因素造成的：首先，“失落的二十年”终结了日本人引以为傲的经济奇迹；其次，日本近十来年走马灯似的换了十来个首相，几乎都是弱势领导人；第三，2011年的福岛核电站事故和日本社会的一些危机使日本民众深受其害。在这些经济、政治和社会问题的综合影响下，日本社会充满了一种不安全感，日本对中国的崛起也愈发感到寝食难安，特别是考虑到中日两国间历史遗留下来的种种宿怨。安倍晋三等日本政客为了获取国内选民的支持，如今似乎已将宝押在了日本的民族主义上。
1972年后，虽然中日两国政府恢复了正常的外交关系，但多数中国人对日本在侵华战争中犯下的罪行记忆犹新，两国民间从未像法国和德国那样，达成真正的和解——毕竟，日本发动的侵华战争夺去了2000多万中国人的性命，几乎完全摧毁了中国的经济。而今，以日本首相为代表的日本右翼势力不但毫无悔罪之意，甚至否认对华战争是侵略行为，我们不妨假设一下，如果德国今日仍然沿用纳粹旗号、纳粹党歌，德国总理和内阁成员仍向供奉着希特勒的神龛致敬，英法民众该作何感想？
在这样的背景下，东京方面单方面做出“国有化”钓鱼岛（日本称“尖阁诸岛”）的决定，当然会在中国掀起轩然大波。回顾历史，钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿一直是台湾的一部分。清王朝在甲午战争中败给日本后，于1895年签订《马关条约》，将台湾全岛及附属岛屿割让给了日本。当第二次世界大战接近尾声时，中美英三国于1943年联合发布《开罗宣言》，规定日本将“自中国人处得到的所有领土，比如满洲、台湾及澎湖群岛”归还给中国。二战结束后不久，中国解放战争爆发，中华人民共和国于1949年成立。此后又相继发生了朝鲜战争和冷战。日本在美国制定的和平宪法的约束下，成为了美国的盟友，美日间的盟友关系一直维持至今。1972年，美国决定把钓鱼岛的管理权交给日本，此举引来了北京、台北与世界各地华人华侨的强烈抗议。
根据中方的记录，1972年中日建交时，双方同意搁置领土争议。1978年，在东京出席《中日和平友好条约》批准书互换仪式的邓小平面对新闻记者说过一段著名的话：“实现中日邦交正常化的时候，我们双方约定不涉及这一问题。这次谈中日和平友好条约的时候，双方也约定不涉及这一问题。……这样的问题放一下不要紧，等十年也没有关系。我们这一代缺少智慧，谈这个问题达不成一致意见。下一代总比我们聪明，定会找到彼此都能接受的方法。”他还提出了一项合理的建议，暨“搁置争议、共同开发（区域内资源）”。时至今日，我认为邓小平的主张仍是最为可行的建议。2012年，日本悍然做出“国有化”钓鱼岛的决定，根本不承认岛屿主权存在争议这一事实，这使大多数中国人倍感羞辱与愤怒。
习近平主席是一位更加自信、对国家也更有信心的领导人，中国的立场也从过去的“战略模糊”转变为“战略清晰”，部分作为对美国“重返亚洲”战略及日本右翼军国主义势力挑衅的回应。习近平主席如是说：中国走和平发展道路，其他国家也都要走和平发展道路。实际上，中日之间已签有四个文件，规定两国必须以和平谈判的方式解决彼此争端。在北京方面看来，日本单方面“国有化”钓鱼岛的行动，违背了这一原则。
海监船在钓鱼岛近海巡航，中国的立场从过去的“战略模糊”转变为“战略清晰”
在某些人眼中，中国的“战略清晰”含有挑衅的色彩，但其实中国仅仅是更清楚表述了自己长期坚持的立场，北京方面明示底线，也许能够避免有关各方误判战略形势，这或许更加符合各方的利益。从某种意义上说，北京可能从自己与台北打交道的过程中获得了一些有益的经验：2003年，中国正式提出了“和平崛起”（“和平发展”），之后的2005年，又通过了《反分裂国家法》，这意味着一旦台湾宣布独立，北京将不得不使用“非和平手段”。这实际上也是北京自1949年以来一直坚持上述立场，然而《反分裂国家法》出台后还是引发了台北方面和西方媒体的强烈不安。但当我们今天回望过去，《反分裂国家法》其实为两岸关系的巨大改善打下了坚实的基础。
中国已经将长期坚持的立场清晰地表达了出来，现在到了日本和有关各方看清并尊重中国底线的时候了。北京、东京和华盛顿应当共同致力于缓和中日之间的紧张局势，美国实际上可以为推动中日和解发挥有益的作用，毕竟在对待二战历史上，美国与安倍首相立场殊异，而对美国在日本的军事存在，中国也不公开反对，中国不少人认为美在日本的军事存在是一种“必要的恶”，一定程度上有助于约束日本军国主义复活、特别是有助于防止日本走核武之路。
在未来十年中，中国很可能取代美国成为世界最大的经济体。在西方的历史上，守成大国与新兴大国之间的关系通常是一场零和博弈，欧洲近现代史中此类先例比比皆是。作为一个文化传统殊异于西方的大国，中国的崛起是西方前所未见的：中国传统里没有西方基督教传统的弥赛亚传教士情结；中国的古老文化是一种“修筑长城”的防御性文化，迥异于西方的殖民文化；中国也是世界上唯一公开承诺不首先使用核武器的核大国。中国确实希望与美国在互相尊重主权、维护共同利益、保持人民友谊的基础上，共同建设“新型大国关系”；但是如果美国处处敌视中国，中国则有可能真的成为其敌人。摆在中美两国面前的，是一次历史性的机遇——作为这个时代的新兴大国与守成大国，中美完全可以跳出固有的历史逻辑，超越对抗与冲突，成为朋友而非敌人。双方应该抓住这次机遇，朝着这个方向努力，而缓和中日间紧张对峙的局面正是中美两国可以首先做的事情。
Time to respect China's red lines
Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan | By Zhang Weiwei
Sino-Japanese relations have never been so precarious since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972. Many observers now even compare the situation to that in Europe a century ago when the First World War was about to rage across the continent. This scenario may be exaggerated, as neither Beijing, nor Tokyo, nor Washington wants a war in the region – that would be disastrous for their shared economic interests and global prosperity– but Beijing-Tokyo relations are indeed experiencing a dangerous drift.
While the Western media seem to focus on what they perceive as a more assertive China, most Chinese blame Japan for the Sino-Japanese predicament, and the Chinese view deserves some attention. From a Chinese perspective, the right turn in Japan's domestic politics is the major cause for the current status of Sino-Japanese relations, and this right turn is a product of three domestic developments in Japan: the country has experienced "two lost decades" which ended the proud Japanese economic miracle; the country has witnessed a string of weak leaders, literally 10 or so prime ministers replacing each other within ten years; and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and other social woes have gripped much of the Japanese society. The combined economic, political and social malaises have shaped among the Japanese a strong sense of insecurity and their perception of China's rise as Japan's possible nightmare, given the historical grievances between the two countries. Japanese politicians like Prime Minister Abe seem now to count on Japan's nationalism for more domestic support.
Despite the normalization of the diplomatic ties between Beijing and Tokyo, regrettably there has never been real reconciliation between the two peoples, as there has, for instance, between France and Germany, and the memory of Japan's war atrocities remain fresh and sharp in the minds of most Chinese. After all, it's a war that caused the deaths of some 20 million Chinese and destroyed the Chinese economy. Yet China is still faced with an unrepentant Japan and a Prime Minister who even refuses to call the war an act of aggression. Just imagine how the French or the British public would react to a Germany that still used the Nazi flag and national anthem and whose chancellor and cabinet ministers still paid homage to Hitler's shrine?
Against this background, it took only a single event like Tokyo's decision to "nationalize" the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands to spark a chain of strong reactions from China. Historically the Diaoyu islands, as part of Taiwan, were ceded to Japan after the Chinese empire was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese war in the 1890s. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 issued by China, the US and Britain demanded that Japan return Taiwan and all other territories it had grabbed, to China. However, China's civil war broke out soon after, followed by the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Korean War of the early 1950s and the Cold War. Japan, under a peace constitution imposed by the US, became a US ally and has remained so up to now. In 1972, the US decided to return the "administrative rights" over the Diaoyu islands to Japan, which triggered sweeping protests from Beijing to Taipei to overseas Chinese communities across the world.
Beijing's record shows that the two sides agreed to set aside the dispute when they established diplomatic ties in 1972. Deng Xiaoping famously said at a press conference held in Tokyo in 1978 when the two sides signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty: "we have agreed to shelve the dispute for the future, and we believe our future generations will be more intelligent than us today in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute." He also advocated a sensible approach to the dispute: that the two countries should defer the issue and start joint exploration (of resources in the area), which to this author, remains the most feasible option for both sides. Obviously Japan's decision in 2012 to "nationalize" the disputed islands, as if China's claim over the islands never existed, humiliated and angered most Chinese.
With the coming to power of President Xi Jinping, a leader more confident of himself and his country, China has shifted its overall stance from what can be called "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic clarity." Partly in reaction to the US "pivot to Asia" and to Japan's rising right-wing militarism, President Xi said that China will pursue peaceful development but others should do the same. Actually, between China and Japan, there are already four legal and political documents committing both sides to solve their disputes peacefully and through negotiations. Japan's unilateral action to "nationalize" the Diaoyu Islands was viewed by Beijing as violating this principle.
Beijing's "strategic clarity" may be provocative to some, yet it may serve the interests of all the actors concerned to avoid strategic miscalculations, as Beijing has only stated its long-held positions in much clearer terms. In this regard, Beijing may have drawn something useful from its dealings with Taipei. Beijing officially advanced the theme of China's "peaceful rise" (later "peaceful development") in 2003, but it adopted an Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which binds Beijing to adopt what's called "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declares independence, a position that Beijing has held since 1949. And the law caused uproar from Taipei and the Western media at that time. But in retrospect, the law has paved the way for the dramatic improvements in Beijing-Taipei relations we witness now.
It's time for Japan, and the other parties concerned to know Beijing's red line, which is only a clearer expression of Beijing's long-held position, and Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan, and the US could play a meaningful role as a facilitator in this regard, and after all, Washington does not share Prime Minister Abe's position on the Second World War, and China does not openly object to the US military presence in Japan, as it is viewed by many in Beijing as a "necessary evil" to check Japan's rising militarism, especially Japan's possible nuclearization.
China may overtake the US as the world's largest economy in less than a decade. In the history of the West, relations between an established power and rising power are often a zero-sum game, and the European history is full of examples of such conflicts. But for the first time, it's the rise of a non-Western power, with a totally different cultural tradition: China does not have a messianic culture of converting others; it has a long culture of building the Great Wall to defend itself from others rather than colonizing others; China is the only nuclear power to openly state that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other countries. China indeed hopes to establish "a new type of major power relationship" with the US, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, common interests and people-to-people friendship. But if the US treats China as an enemy, China may indeed become its enemy. History presents an opportunity to the two countries to become friends, rather than enemies, moving beyond the old logic of confrontation between established and rising powers. The two sides should grasp it and start in this direction perhaps with some meaningful initiatives to defuse Sino-Japanese tensions.
